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Marx, Hegel and tHe orient




In my contribution, I will firstly focus on the role that the Hegelian 
vision of the Orient plays in Marx’s analysis of the non‑Western world 
from the 1850s onwards. Secondly, I will concentrate on the use of 
Hegelian dialectics in Marx’s late enquiry about non‑capitalist societies, 
and semi‑Asiatic Russia in particular. 
It will be seen that Marx’s major debt to Hegel no longer concerns the 
account of the basic features of Oriental society as an abstract category 
relating to a general theory of history. Neither is it limited to the extrinsic 
application of the laws of Hegelian dialectics to the concrete situation of 
single Asiatic societies like India, China or Russia. Rather, I will argue that 
what is ultimately at stake in such a relationship is the intrinsic capability 
of the dialectical method to take into account the multilinearity and 
discontinuity in history without being reduced either to absolute relativism 
or to determinism. 
1. Hegel, Marx and Orientalism 
It is plain that Hegel is one of Marx’s sources of information about the 
Oriental society from the early 1850s onward, that is to say, since Marx 
started serving as London correspondent for the New-York Daily Tribune. 
1  emanuelaconversano@gmail.com.
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Actually, one of the first proofs of Marx’s interest in Asian affairs is a 
letter he wrote to Engels in early June 1853, just a couple of weeks before 
publishing his first article about the village communities of Asia in the 
American newspaper. 
So far as religion is concerned, the question may be reduced to a general 
and hence easily answerable one: Why does the history of the East appear 
as a history of religions?
 On the subject of the growth of eastern cities one could hardly 
find anything more brilliant, comprehensive or striking than Voyages 
contenant la description des états du Grand Mogol, etc. by old François 
Bernier (for 9 years Aurangzeb’s physician). […] [H]e remarks inter alia: 
 ‘[T]he king is the sole and unique proprietor of all the lands in the 
kingdom, whence it necessarily follows that every capital city, such as 
Delhi or Agra, fixes almost wholly on the militia and is therefore obliged 
to follow the king whenever he goes campaigning for a time, these cities 
neither being, nor indeed able to be, in any respect a Paris, but being really 
nothing but an army encampment rather better and more commodiously 
situated than if it were in the open country.’ […] 
 Bernier rightly sees all the manifestations of the East – he mentions 
Turkey, Persia and Hindustan – as having a common basis, namely the 
absence of private landed property. This is the real clef, even to the 
eastern heaven.2
The question about the coincidence of Oriental history and history of 
religion recalls a century-old tradition, dating back to the first contacts 
of the European travellers with Asia, which unfold amid a mixture of 
ideas and theories about the Orient. On the one hand, the comparative 
method in the history of religion and the discovery of a set of connected 
Indo‑European languages during the late 18th and early 19th century gives 
birth to a fascination for the ancient Orient, serving an idea of European 
Renaissance. The Proto‑Romantic and Romantic enthusiasm for the East 
as the source of all science and wisdom has developed along with the 
translation of Indian religious texts and the study of Sanskrit, acquiring the 
contours of an “Oriental Renaissance”, as defined in the classic study on 
European Orientalism by Raymond Schwab.3
2  Karl Marx an Friedrich Engels, 2. Juni 1853, in MEGA III/6, pp. 180‑184, trans. in Karl 
Marx – Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Electric Book, Lawrence & Wishart, 2010, vol. 
39, pp. 332‑334. (In the original, the quote from Bernier is in French, with Marx’s italics). 
3  See Raymond Schwab, La Renaissance orientale, Paris: Editions Payot, 1950, who 
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Until 1820, for equal and opposite reasons, Hegel does not deal with the 
Orient except for the philosophy of religion. Against the myth of the origins 
of the “Romantic Orientalist project” of “Europe‑regenerated‑by‑Asia”,4 
he firmly distinguishes the moment of religious representation from that of 
the philosophical concept and confines the Orient to the former. As Ernst 
Shulin points out in his important contribution to understanding the place 
of Asia in Hegel’s theory, since the Orient has no philosophy yet, it can 
only be considered, at best, from the point of view of the history of religion, 
yet conceptually explained.5 In his seminal book Hegel et l’Orient, Michel 
Hulin adds that the turning point in Hegel’s understanding of the East is the 
Philosophy of Right, where the problem of the Orient is for the first time 
approached from a political perspective and no longer from the point of 
view of religion:6 i.e., Hegel takes the point of view of the State – or, to put it 
in the terms of his own philosophical system, he switches from the domain 
of the “Absolute Spirit” to that of the “Objective Spirit”. Hulin refers to 
paragraph § 355 of the last section of the third part: World History, where 
the State is seen as the content of history, the “principium individuationis” 
of spirit’s liberating movement towards self‑consciousness, which will be 
the core of the Lectures on the Philosophy of History. 
In accordance with the four principles of this dialectical movement 
(to summarize: the immediate identity of the substantial spirit; the ethical 
individuality as beauty; the abstract universality; the reconciliation of 
freedom and necessity, objectivity and subjectivity), Hegel lists the four 
world‑historical realms: (1) the Oriental, (2) the Greek, (3) the Roman, (4) 
the Germanic. The Oriental one is described as follows:
§ 355
(1) The Oriental realm.
The world-view of this first realm is substantial, without inward division, 
and it arises in natural communities patriarchically governed. According 
to this view, the mundane form of government is theocratic, the ruler is 
also a high priest or God himself; constitution and legislation are at the 
borrowed the term from a chapter of Edgard Quinet, Du génie des religions, Paris: 
Charpentier, Éditeur, 1842.
4  See Edward W. Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books, 1979, pp. 113‑115. 
5 Ernst Schulin, Die Weltgeschichtliche Erfassung des Orients bei Hegel und Ranke, 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958 (I refer to the Italian translation, L’idea di 
Oriente in Hegel e Ranke, Napoli: Liguori Editore, p. 72).
6  Michel Hulin, Hegel et l’Orient, Paris: Vrin, 1979, p. 37. 
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same time religion, while religious and moral commands, or usages rather, 
are at the same time natural and positive law. […] Hence in the Oriental 
state nothing is fixed, and what is stable is fossilised; it lives therefore 
only in an outward movement which becomes in the end an elemental fury 
and desolation. Its inner calm is merely the calm of non‑political life and 
immersion in feebleness and exhaustion.
A still substantial, natural, mentality is a moment in the development of 
the state, and the point at which any state takes this form is the absolute 
beginning of its history. […]7
Hegel’s background as regards the defining political characteristics of 
the Oriental State, rather than being the spiritual representation of the East 
as sketched by the Romantics in order to build a rejuvenated self‑image 
of Europe, refers to the construction of a political judgement on the 
Orient within a broader theory of society in general and of general social 
development. Both aspects contribute to sketch the features of Western 
Orientalism, which deals with a model of Oriental society that does not 
correspond to any concrete manifestation of it, but is rather counterposed to 
the Occidental society. In both cases, the Orient appears – to paraphrase the 
core thesis of Edward. B. Said’s critique of the Orientalist tradition – as a 
European invention to build and support Europe’s own self‑consciousness 
and to justify the Western domination of the East. 
In particular, the roots of such a theory of the Oriental Society lie in 
the concept of “oriental despotism”, which, from the early 17th century, 
European writers (including mercantilists, physiocrats, utilitarians, French 
political philosophers, Scottish moralists and classical economists) put 
together on the basis of travel reports and develop in the framework of 
sociological and political thought alongside the colonial discourse. In this 
respect, Hegel and Marx are both indebted to the tradition that identifies 
the Oriental sovereign as the sole head of the State, State religion and 
morality. To a certain extent, Hegel is to Marx merely one of the sources of 
knowledge about the Orient. While preparing his articles for the New-York 
Daily Tribune on the British rule in India, Marx collected a large number 
of notes from the writings of English travellers, historians and politicians 
– such as Robert Patton, Thomas Stamford Raffles, George Campbell, 
Mark Wills – in the section on India (including short excerpts on China, 
7  George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, trans. by 
T.M. Knox, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, London‑Oxford‑New York: Oxford University 
Press, 19782, p. 220. 
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as well) of his London Notebooks, which are about to be published in the 
new Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe.8 But one of his main sources, as we 
have seen in the first quote, is Francois Bernier, a 17th‑century French 
physician and traveller who anticipated the debate among English writers 
on the existence of private property in Asia. Marx reverses Bernier’s 
positive thesis of the Oriental king being the sole proprietor of the soil, 
negatively inferring the absence of private land property in the Orient.9 
During the early 1850s, Marx starts elaborating the notion of village life 
in opposition to the modern capitalist society by using India and China as 
the concrete manifestations of a determinate abstraction: the concept of an 
archetypal Oriental society, which survived unaltered until the Europeans 
came into contact with Asia through commerce (in the case of China) and 
colonization (in the case of India). 
In his texts on current affairs, Marx basically retains the differences 
between China and India that Hegel outlined in his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History, when distinguishing Chinese moral despotism from 
Indian arbitrary despotism, whilst reiterating their common immutability. 
Many pages recall famous passages of the Hegelian Lectures: in the 
New-York Daily Tribune’s 1853 article Revolution in China and Europe, 
“the complete isolation” is set down as the “prime condition of the 
preservation of Old China”.10 Similarly, in the article The Future Results of 
the British Rule in India, Marx states: 
India, then, could not escape the fate of being conquered, and the whole 
of her past history, if it be anything, is the history of the successive 
conquests she has undergone. Indian society has no history at all, at 
least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of the 
successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of 
that unresisting and unchanging society.11
8  They will appear in the volume 11 of the IV. Abteilung. Wolfgang Rein has already 
collected these excerpts in his PhD Thesis Die Indienexzerpte im Heft XXII der “Londoner 
Hefte 1850–53” von Karl Marx, University of Halle‑Wittenberg, 1988.
9  Lawrence Krader, The Asiatic Mode of Production: Sources, Development and Critique 
in the Writings of Karl Marx, Assen: Van Gorcum Press, 1975, p. 86.
10  Karl Marx, “Revolution in China and in Europe,” in New-York Daily Tribune Nr. 3794, 
14. Juni 1853, in MEGA I/12, p. 149. But see also Marx – Engels, Revue. Januar/Februar 
1850, in Neue Rheinische Zeitung. Politisch-ökonomische Revue, 2. H., Februar 1850, 
in MEGA I/10, pp. 219‑220, trans. in Marx – Engels, Collected Works, vol. 10, p. 267). 
11  Karl Marx, “The Future Results of British Rule in India”, New-York Daily Tribune, Nr. 
3840, 8. August 1853, in MEGA III/6, p. 248.
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The Hegelian motives are evident: in Hegel’s philosophy of history, the 
Orient is seen as having the paradoxical status of being out of history and 
the very beginning of universal history. The paradox is due to the point of 
view from which Hegel considers the question: i.e., the Occident, taken 
as the result of the historical development. Orient is a relative concept 
(“kat’exochon”): it is Orient for us;12 but, at the same time, it is absolutely 
East since the present form of spirit comprehends within itself all earlier 
steps as single moments of the progressive self‑consciousness of spirit. 
World history is a movement from East to West because it is conceived as 
the progression of the spirit whose substantial purpose is the consciousness 
of Freedom. Since in the Orient “only one is free” and the spirit has not 
achieved the consciousness of freedom,13 the history of the East and the 
history of the West are simply homonymous. 
With the Empire of China History has to begin, for it is the oldest, 
as far as history gives us any information; and its principle has such 
substantiality, that for the empire in question it is at once the oldest 
and the newest. Early do we see China advancing to the condition 
in which it is found at this day; for as the contrast between objective 
existence and subjective freedom of movement in it, is still wanting, 
every change is excluded, and the fixedness of a character which recurs 
perpetually, takes the place of what we should call the truly historical. 
China and India lie, as it were, still outside the World’s History, as the 
mere presupposition of elements whose combination must be waited 
for to constitute their vital progress.14 
The history of the Orient is nothing but repetition, whatever the case: 
the stasis of the Chinese empire or the chronicle of the conquests of India 
to which Hegel – and, to a large extent, Marx in his first articles, as well – 
reduces the history of those nations. 
From this standpoint – from the point of view of history as philosophically 
conceived, Hegel is not just one among many sources at Marx’s disposal, 
but an intellectual father to be reckoned with. 
12  See George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Weltgeschichte, in Hegel, Werke in 20 Bänden, hrsg. von E. Moldenhauer – K.‑M. Michel, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1969‑1979, XII, p. 134, trans. by J. Sibree, Lectures on 
the Philosophy of History, New York: The Colonial Press, 1900, pp. 109‑110. 
13  Ivi, p. 31 (trans. pp. 18‑19). 
14  Ivi, pp. 145‑146 (trans. pp. 121). 
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The sentence “World history has not always existed; history as world 
history [is] a result”, that we can read in the last page of the Introduction 
to the Grundrisse,15 looks like a quote from Hegel; just as the famous 
metaphor of human anatomy which explains the anatomy of the ape in 
the same Introduction can be read as a paraphrase of the same concept. 
The knowledge of contemporary society, which is the highest level 
of development so far, is taken as the starting point of any historical 
consideration; and the other social forms can be truly understood through 
a contrastive analysis only, by comparing them to the most developed.16
2. From Oriental Despotism to the Asiatic Mode of Production: 
Universal History and the History of Capital 
Both Marx and Hegel recognize the opposition between the political centre 
and the isolated villages as the key to Asiatic despotism and stagnation. This 
kind of explanation has been worked out in comparison and by contrast to 
the connection between civil society and political power in modern Western 
society. However, whereas Hegel focuses on the State, Marx concentrates on 
the material basis,17 i.e., the mode of production of the village communities, 
whose self-sufficiency is ensured by the predominance of agriculture and the 
productive unity of soil cultivation and home manufacture.
These two circumstances – the Hindoo, on the one hand, leaving, like all 
Oriental peoples, to the Central Government the care of the great public 
works, the prime condition of his agriculture and commerce, dispersed, 
on the other hand, over the surface of the country, and agglomerated in 
small centers by the domestic union of agricultural and manufacturing 
pursuits – these two circumstances had brought about, since the remotest 
times, a social system of particular features – the so‑called village 
system, which gave to each of these small unions their independent 
organization and distinct life. […] [W]e must not forget that these idyllic 
village‑communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always 
been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism.18
15  Karl Marx, Einleitung zu den „Grundrissen der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie“, in 
MEGA II/1, p. 44, trans. in Marx – Engels, Collected Works, vol. 28, p. 46.
16  Ivi, p. 40 (trans. p. 42). 
17  Karl Marx an Friedrich Engels, 14. Juni 1853, in MEGA III/6, p. 199, trans. in Marx – 
Engels, Collected Works, vol. 39, p. 347. 
18  Karl Marx, “The British Rule in India”, in New-York Daily Tribune, Nr. 3804, 25. Juni 
1853, in MEGA I/12, p. 171. 
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Marx’s judgements on the “barbarian” character of the Eastern 
nations, scattered in his 1850s writings along with statements about the 
“fate” of the Orient and the “revolutionary role” of Britain in India,19 
have led to accusations of ethnocentrism, which I cannot discuss in 
detail. Parenthetically, it can be said that Marx himself was more than 
conscious of his provocation, as he confesses to Engels on June 14th 1853.20 
Additionally, the more Marx became acquainted with the cruel methods 
and the “destructive mission” of the British government in India during 
the London years, the more his critical judgement becomes evident and 
unequivocal.21 But apart from his private outpourings and the deepening 
of his knowledge of the situation in the colonies, Marx’s ethnocentrism 
of the early 1850s must be put in the perspective of his own critique of 
political economy and theory of social change. 
During these years, he reflects on the structure of the village communities 
at the “peripheries” of capital from the point of view of the capitalist centre, 
opposing the conservative economic and social relations of the former to the 
revolutionary character of the latter, where the socio‑economic antagonism 
has been radicalised. Since the “village does not generate within itself the 
oppositions of the social classes, just as it does not generate within itself 
the production of commodities”,22 it cannot generate a revolution. The 
revolution has to come from the outside; otherwise, the life of the villages 
would go on with no significant – properly historical – change. 
In this period, Marx deals with the problem of the progress of the “modes 
of production”, starting from the analysis of the role of the bourgeoisie in 
creating the world market and in constantly revolutionising the instruments 
and relations of production, and “with them the whole relations of society” 
(as he wrote in the Communist Manifesto).23 This kind of reasoning leads 
him to build his critique of political economy from the second half of 
the 1850s: that is to say, the investigation on the relations of production 
in the specific case of modern capitalist society, and precisely when the 
signs of its overcoming are emerging. For this purpose, Marx makes use 
of a “historical analysis” not to write the “real history of the production 
19  See ivi, pp. 166ff. and “The Future Results of British Rule in India”, New-York Daily 
Tribune, Nr. 3840, 8. August 1853, in MEGA I/12, pp. 248ff. 
20  Marx an Engels, 14. Juni 1853, p. 198 (trans. p. 346). 
21  See the New-York Daily Tribune’s articles of 1857‑1859, collected in MEW 12‑13 and 
MEGA I/18. 
22  Lawrence Krader, The Asiatic Mode of Production, p. 90. 
23  Marx – Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, in MEW 4, p. 465, trans. in 
Marx – Engels, Collected Works, vol. 6, p. 487. 
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relations”,24 and certainly not an evolutionist theory of stages, but to grasp 
the specific difference of the present relations, recognized as historical. 
That is why the description of the Oriental communal forms he sketches in 
the Grundrisse, in particular in the section “Forms which precede capitalist 
production”, is a sort of negative description focusing on the result of the 
process towards the separation between the subject and the conditions of 
production: i.e., the “[d]issolution of his relation to the earth – land and 
soil – as natural condition of production to which man relates as to his own 
inorganic being”; and the “[d]issolution of the relations in which he appears 
as proprietor of the instrument” of production.25 And that is why Marx 
initially labels the cases of non‑capitalist relations in his time as “ruins”, 
“remains”26 of other organizations of production that have been logically 
overcome by capital. Consequently, contemporary societies which differ 
from the capitalist one are seen as the past of the modern bourgeois society. 
It is certainly true that the oxymoronic traits of what Ernst Bloch 
calls Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen27 [the simultaneity of the 
non‑simultaneous] and of the geographical attribute that Marx employs to 
encompass a broad category of past and present forms of common property 
lead to some ambiguity. Above all in the controversial sequence of the 
forms of production outlined in the famous Preface to Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy:
In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of 
production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic 
development of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last 
antagonistic form of the social process of production – antagonistic not in 
the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from 
the individuals’ social conditions of existence – but the productive forces 
developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for 
a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly 
closes with this social formation.28
24  Karl Marx, Grundrisse, p. 369, trans. in Marx – Engels, Collected Works, vol. 28, 
pp. 388‑389. 
25 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, p. 400 (trans. p. 421). Marx’s italics. 
26  Karl Marx, Einleitung zu den „Grundrissen“, p. 40 (trans. p. 42). 
27  See Ernst Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, in Gesamtausgabe in sechzehn Bänden, Berlin: 
Suhrkamp, 1985, Bd. 4.
28  Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Vorwort, in MEGA II/2, p. 101, trans. 
in Marx – Engels, Collected Works, vol. 29, pp. 263‑264. 
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Despite, or precisely because of, its briefness and the allusion to the 
“Asiatic mode of production”, which is a hapax legomenon in Marx’s 
writings, this passage has opened a long‑lasting debate among the scholars 
who have been trying to solve the ambiguities, or at least to clarify the 
different issues at stake in those few lines – a complex discussion, which is 
obviously impossible to reconstruct here. However, it can be said that the 
paradox of a geographical concept used as the starting point of a historical 
series is indeed the symptom of the complex connection of abstract and 
concrete, logical and historical in Marx’s conception of capital and history, 
as well as in the relation between theory and praxis. 
To some extent, Marx is radically progressive. He firmly believes 
that it is impossible for the productive forces to stay still and perpetuate 
themselves eternally. Nonetheless, identifying the productive forces as the 
determining agent of the progress of production relations, and – mediately 
– of the so‑called political and cultural superstructure, also means that the 
progress, although irreversible, does not have to be understood as absolute 
and unilinear in an historico‑philosophical sense. It can be conceived as a 
contradictory history, both from an abstract and from a concrete point of 
view. The history of the contradictions between relations of production 
and productive forces, which can be theoretically and logically described 
as an irreversible series of stages, involves the concrete revolutionary 
subjects of history, which can act as drivers for historical change not in 
voluntaristic terms, but on the basis of given conditions which necessarily 
grow within society itself. In this regard, even the attempts of the colonies 
to resist British oppression, during the sepoys rebellions in India or the 
Opium wars in China, are not to be seen as “revolutions”, because their 
final purpose was the conservation of the old modes of production in 
unaltered form.29 In the colonies, the conditions that Marx identifies as 
the basis for revolution have still not occurred. As he writes in Capital’s 
first volume, in the chapter on “The modern theory of colonisation”, “the 
separation of the labourer from the conditions of labour and their root, the 
soil, does not exist, or only sporadically”.30 Therefore, the labourer has not 
reached that contradictory freedom that brings in itself the conditions for 
the socialization of the means of production and the annihilation of private 
property, so relevant for Marx’s general theory of historical development. 
29  See Karl Marx, “Der indische Aufstand”, in New-York Daily Tribune, Nr. 5119 vom 16. 
September 1857 and “Die Geschichte des Opiumhandels” in New-York Daily Tribune Nr. 
5438 vom 25. September 1858, in MEW 12, respectively pp. 285‑288 and pp. 549‑556. 
30  Karl Marx, Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Erster Band, MEGA II/10, 
p. 689, trans. in Marx – Engels, Collected Works, vol. 35, p. 755. 
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Such a general scheme will remain unaltered throughout Marx’s entire 
intellectual production. Its roots lie in the Hegelian concept of history as 
a dialectical development of historical possibilities, in contrast with the 
existing circumstances. However, Hegel conceives historical development 
as the movement of the spirit against itself through a progression toward the 
political society. He adopted the criterion of the different forms of State as 
the individuation principle of historical progress, whereas Marx seeks the 
active principle of history in the modes of production, which are the result of 
the way in which the subjects of production interact and relate to the objects 
of production and, at a certain stage of development, come into conflict 
with the existing relations of production. Concretely, he thus recognizes the 
class struggle as the driving force of human history. It is not a matter of 
“world‑historical individuals” who “have an insight into what [is] ripe for 
development”,31 but of an endogenous movement based on given historical 
circumstances and progressively attaining class consciousness. 
3. The place of semi-Asiatic Russia in Historical Dialectics 
It is from this angle that Marx, from the late 1850s on, starts to recognize 
an “internal development” in the apparently stationary Russian society,32 
whose socioeconomic base is the obščina, a modified form of the “Oriental” 
village community; and he decides to further investigate Russia’s inner 
transformation potential through the reading of Russian‑language sources. 
Like China, Russia has not been politically colonized by the Europeans, 
although capitalist production has progressively penetrated the Russian social 
system. Nonetheless, in contrast to India and China, Russia has the peculiar 
character of being “half‑Asiatic”,33 representing the East of – in – Europe.
While Marx adopted the point of view of Oriental despotism, which can 
be partly explained by the lack of primary sources, on the one hand, and 
by the contingent historical situation, on the other, Russia was seen both 
as the bulwark of the European Restoration and as an embodiment of the 
concept of Asiatic society. Basically, it was kept out of history, just as it 
had been by Hegel: 
31  George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, pp. 44‑45 (trans. pp. 31‑32).
32  Marx an Engels, 29. April 1858, in MEGA III/9, p. 134, trans. in Marx – Engels, 
Collected Works, vol. 40, p. 134.
33  See Karl Marx, “The Emancipation Question”, in New-York Daily Tribune, Nr. 5535 
vom 17. Januar 1859, in Marx‑Engels, Collected Works, vol. 40, p. 147. 
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We find, moreover, in the East of Europe, the great Sclavonic nation, […] 
[the] Magyars (Hungarians) […], Bulgarians, Servians, and Albanians, 
likewise of Asiatic origin – left behind as broken barbarian remains in the 
shocks and counter‑shocks of the advancing hordes. These people did, 
indeed, found kingdoms and sustain spirited conflicts with the various 
nations that came across their path. Sometimes, as an advanced guard 
– an intermediate nationality – they took part in the struggle between 
Christian Europe and unchristian Asia. […] [T]he Sclaves have to 
some extent been drawn within the sphere of Occidental Reason. Yet 
this entire body of peoples remains excluded from our consideration, 
because hitherto it has not appeared as an independent element in the 
series of phases that Reason has assumed in the World. Whether it will 
do so hereafter, is a question that does not concern us here; for in History 
we have to do with the Past.34
Unlike Hegel, Marx is more and more interested in the future development, 
and engages in a discussion with the Russian populists about the following 
historical steps, especially from the beginning of the 1870s onward.35 
The Russian intellectual movement is becoming aware of a turning 
point in Russian history, with the Russian commune still alive but under 
the pressure of capital. Some members turn to Marx to learn his opinion 
on the future of the Russian peasant community and on the theory that it 
is historically necessary for every country in the world to pass through 
all the phases of capitalist production, mentioned by the revolutionary 
Vera Zasulich in a famous 1881 letter to Marx.36 Rather than being just 
the representation of the past of European society, the village community 
becomes a possible future alternative to capitalism. 
The attention to recent Russian history and the contacts with Russian 
intelligentsia from the 1860s, along with the reading of anthropologists 
from the late 1870s to his death,37 contribute to a significant increase in 
34  George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen, p. 385 (trans. p. 363).
35  Karl Marx an Sigfrid Meyer, 21. Januar 21 1871, in MEW 33, p. 173. 
36  Vera I. Zassoulitch à Karl Marx, MEGA I/25 (Apparat), p. 823. 
37  See the notes from Lewis Henry Morgan, Sir John Budd Phear, Sir Henry Sumner 
Maine, Sir John Lubbock, collected in Karl Marx: The Ethnological Notebooks, ed. by 
Lawrence Krader, Assen: van Gorcum, 1972, but also those from Maksim Kovalevskij 
on the communal possession of land, in Karl Marx über Formen vorkapitalistischer 
Produktion. Vergleichende Studien zur Geschichte des Grundeigentums 1879-80 Aus 
dem handschriften Nachlaβ, ed. by Hans‑Peter Harstic, Frankfurt‑New York: Campus 
Verlag, 1977. 
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Marx’s knowledge of non‑Western societies, and to a more complex view 
of history in terms of a multilinear development.
By learning about the history of the dissolution of the communal 
forms of property through the works of the ethnologists, Marx becomes 
more familiar with several forms of exploitation on the part of producers. 
He realizes that the history, or rather the histories of the separation of 
individuals from their community are long and complex, and concludes 
– with consequences for his theoretical framework and vocabulary – that 
behind and beyond these forms of exploitation there is not only a passive 
resistance, and the attempt to preserve old modes of production, but also 
the possibility of better conditions and an autonomous emancipation.
In the drafts of the letter to Vera Zasulich, Marx abandons generic 
geographical attributes such as “Asiatic mode of production”, “Oriental” 
or “Indian society”, and the corresponding political expression “Oriental 
despotism”, to adopt more neutral expressions as “primary”, “secondary 
formation”, “tertiary and other types”,38 etc. Due to the historical 
circumstances and to Marx’s degree of knowledge about the non‑Western 
world, the first set of concepts – to use Lawrence Krader’s words, even if 
not specifically referring to the letter – 
had become too global, non-malleable, and insufficiently sensitive for the 
critique of capital, of colonialism, and of the development of capitalism 
in Asia, just as, paralleling these developments and determining them, 
the introduction of capitalist relations of production in Asia brought 
about the extinction of the Asiatic mode of production in fact.39 
The penetration of capitalism in the peripheries of the world put 
non‑capitalist societies in the spotlight: this empirical evidence urged 
researchers to consider the possible positive aspects of the backwardness 
of societies that were traditionally considered – i.e., in the Western 
historical‑philosophical tradition – as being outside world history, and 
logically corresponding to the “childhood” of human sociality. Both Lewis 
Henry Morgan – the American anthropologist from whose book Marx 
takes most of his notes about ancient societies and American tribes – and 
the Russian scholar Nikolai Chernyshevsky – whose economic books 
38  Karl Marx, Lettre à Vera Ivanovna Zassoulitch, in MEGA I/25, premier projet, 
p. 229 trans. in Theodor Shanin (ed.), Late Marx and the Russian road: Marx and “the 
peripheries of capitalism”, New‑York: Monthly Review Press, 1983, p. 107. 
39  Lawrence Krader, The Asiatic Mode of Production, p. 90. 
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lead Marx to learn Russian,40 and through whom he becomes familiar 
with the position of Russian populism – seem to recognize the merits of 
“backward” nations. On that basis, they hazard a prediction about the 
destiny of their peoples that sounds like an extrinsic application of the 
laws of Hegelian dialectics. 
Chernyshevsky deals with the question of a society’s need to pass 
through all the logical transitions of historical development in his 
1859 text A Critique of Philosophical Prejudices against Communal 
Ownership. Although he declares not to be a disciple of Hegel (probably 
to avoid the Russian censorship),41 he resorts to two principles of modern 
science that he identifies with German philosophy. 
We were concerned with the question of whether a given social 
phenomenon has to pass through all the logical moments in the real life 
of every society, or whether under favourable circumstances it can leap 
from the first or the second stage of development directly to the fifth of 
sixth, omitting the ones in the middle, as happens with the phenomena of 
individual life and in the processes of physical nature…
 Two whole printer’s sheets have brought us to two conclusions, which 
for any reader at all familiar with the ideas of modern science, could have 
been adequately conveyed in six lines: 
 1. the higher stage of development coincides in form with its source;
 2. under the influence of the high development which a certain 
phenomenon of social life has attained among the most advanced 
peoples, this phenomenon can develop very swiftly among higher 
peoples, and raise from a lower level to a higher one, passing over the 
intermediate logical moments.42 
Reputedly, Marx started reading this text at the end of 1870, and he 
must have been impressed by the way in which Chernyshevsky treats the 
topic, for he recognizes the advantages of the backwardness of the obščina 
both against its detractors in the name of the superiority of capitalism 
and against the defenders of a supposed mystical character of the village 
community. However, according to his repeated statements against any 
mystified form of thought, Marx might also have taken some distance from 
40  Marx an Meyer, 21. Januar 1871, p. 173.
41  Guy Planty‑Bonjour, Hegel et la pensée philosophique en Russie, 1830-1917, The 
Hague: Nijhoff: 1974, p. 207. 
42  Nikolai Chernyshevsky, A Critique of Philosophical Prejudices against Communal 
Ownership, trans. in Theodor Shanin (ed.), Late Marx and the Russian road, p. 188. 
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the abstractly, pseudo‑dialectical form of Chernyshevsky’s argument,43 as 
much as from the idealistic drifts of Morgan’s anthropology. 
Marx’s attitude towards Morgan has to be considered at least as twofold, 
since he appreciates Morgan’s discovery of the gens – the consanguine 
group descending from the same ancestor, seen as the basis of the ancient 
social organization, in which there are no private property, class and state 
relations – and makes use of Morgan’s consequent history of the family 
– according to which the “monogamian family” is not the natural family 
formation, but the result of a long historical development – as a basis to 
criticize the ideological naturalization of the family in the works of the 
other anthropologists he read in the late 1870s, and to present the modern 
family as the “miniature” of all the antagonisms of society and the State.44 
However, he has reservations about Morgan’s general theory of history. The 
latter’s concept of development is an evolutionist account of the progress 
from barbarism to civilisation that all peoples should achieve, according 
to the “plan of a Supreme Intelligence” which Marx cannot accept, as the 
systematic omissions in his notes on Morgan’s book silently testify.45 
Against my interpretation of a silent critique of Morgan in Marx’s 
notebooks, one could remark that he even quotes a passage of Morgan’s 
Ancient Society, in a draft of the Zasulich‑correspondence, to argue in 
favour of the maintenance of the Russian commune:
Also favourable to the maintenance of the Russian commune (on the path 
of development) is the fact not only that it is contemporary with capitalist 
production [in the Western countries], but that it has survived the epoch 
when the social system stood intact. Today, it faces a social system 
which, both in Western Europe and the United States, is in conflict with 
science, with the popular masses, and with the very productive forces 
that it generates [in short, this social system has become the arena of 
flagrant antagonisms, conflicts and periodic disasters; it makes clear to 
the blindest observer that it is a transitory system of production, doomed 
to be eliminated as soc(iety) returns to... ]. In short, the rural commune 
finds it in a state of crisis that will end only when the social system is 
eliminated through the return of modern societies to the ‘archaic’ type of 
43  See Guy Planty‑Bonjour, Hegel et la pensée philosophique en Russie, pp. 190ff. 
44  Karl Marx: The Ethnological Notebooks, p. 120.
45  See, for instance, the Chapter 3, “Ratio of Human Progress” of Lewis Henry Morgan, 
Ancient Society, or Researches in the lines of Human Progress from Savagery through 
Barbarism to Civilisation, C. H. Kerr, Chicago 18772, but also p. 563, which has no 
correspondence in Marx’s Ethnological Notebooks. 
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communal property. In the words of an American writer who, supported 
in his work by the Washington government, is not at all to be suspected of 
revolutionary tendencies, [‘the higher plane’] ‘the new system’ to which 
modern society is tending ‘will be a revival, in a superior form, of an 
archaic social type.’46
Marx must certainly have been struck by this passage, which he had 
already quoted in his notebooks.47 However, if he completely agreed, 
he should not have written, in the same draft, that “the history of the 
decadence of primitive communities is yet to be written”, adding that it 
would be wrong to put them all on the same plane. Although he recognizes 
the theoretical possibility of future change as the survival of an original 
condition, he also denies it can be predetermined as a fatalité historique 
[historical inevitability], totally apart from the understanding of “all 
the historical twists and turns”.48 After listing the factors that cause the 
duplicity of the agricultural commune, at a crossroads between survival 
and destruction, Marx writes:
[T]he ‘agricultural commune’ everywhere presents itself as the most 
recent type of the archaic formation of societies; and the period of the 
agricultural commune appears in the historical course of Western Europe, 
both ancient and modern, as a period of transition from communal to 
private property, from the primary to the secondary formation. But does 
this mean that the development of the ‘agricultural commune’ must follow 
this route in every circumstance [in every historical context] [milieu 
historique]? Not at all. Its constitutive form allows of the following 
alternative: either the element of private property which it implies gains 
the upper hand over the collective element, or the reverse takes place. 
Everything depends upon the historical context in which it is situated.... 
Both solutions are a priori possibilities, but each one naturally requires a 
completely different historical context.49 
Rather than applying from the outside a general, a priori and 
unhistorical law to the concrete circumstances of the “real history”, Marx 
46  Karl Marx, Lettre à Vera Ivanovna Zassoulitch [février/mars 1881], in MEGA I/25, 
p. 220, trans. in Theodor Shanin (ed.), Late Marx and the Russian road, p. 107.
47  Karl Marx: The Ethnological Notebooks, p. 139.
48  See Karl Marx, Lettre à Vera Ivanovna Zassoulitch, in MEGA I/25, pp. 219ff, trans. in 
in Theodor Shanin (ed.), Late Marx and the Russian road, pp. 105ff. 
49  Ivi, 224 (trans. 109).
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is simultaneously trying – through the concept of “milieu historique” – to 
historically and geographically restrict his theory of history and to make 
it more responsive to the different concrete contexts he has been studying, 
with increasing depth, in his ethnological notes. In brief, he is trying to 
reduce the gap between the logical and historical levels, worldwide 
geography and the theory of history. 
Even before reading the anthropologists in the late 1870s, he had 
already used the concept of “milieu historique” to defend his theory of 
history, as laid out in the first book of Capital, against the allegations of a 
Russian reviewer, who: 
[…] insists on transforming my historical sketch of the genesis of 
capitalism in Western Europe into an historico‑philosophic theory of the 
general course fatally imposed on all peoples, whatever the historical 
circumstances in which they find themselves posed, in order to arrive 
ultimately at this economic formation which assures the greatest 
expansion of the productive powers of social labour, as well as the most 
complete development of man. But I beg his pardon. That is to do me 
both too much honour and too much discredit. Let us take an example.
 At various points in Capital I allude to the fate that befell the plebeians 
of ancient Rome. They were originally free peasants, each tilling his 
own plot on his own behalf. In the course of Roman history they were 
expropriated. […] The Roman proletarians became, not wage‑labourers 
but an idle mob more abject than those who used to be called ‘poor whites’ 
in the southern United States; and what opened up alongside them was 
not a capitalist but a slave mode of production. Thus events of striking 
similarity, taking place in different historic contexts [milieux historiques] 
led to totally disparate results. By studying each of these developments 
separately, and then comparing them, one may easily discover the key to 
this phenomenon. But success will never come with the master‑key of a 
general historico‑philosophical theory, whose supreme virtue consists in 
being supra‑historical.50 
The reference to historical circumstances, along with the use of 
historical analogies in an anti‑evolutionist and anti‑determinist way, reveal 
Marx’s effort not to abandon his historical and materialistic dialectics in 
the name of absolute relativism, but to repeatedly re‑assess it in order to 
50  K. Marx, À la rédaction de l’«Отечественные записки» [Oktober/November 1877], 
in MEGA I/25, p. 116, trans. in Theodor Shanin (ed.), Late Marx and the Russian road, 
p. 116.
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keep up with history and the heterogeneity of the real. From this point 
of view, the East is no longer an abstract geographical concept at the 
service of Western history, nor is it used in the interest of colonization or 
the capitalist penetration outside Western Europe; rather, it spreads in the 
more concrete historical milieus which can better explain world history. 
Ultimately, in Marx’s last remarks on the subject, there is no more space for 
an “Orient” against the “Occident”. This unitary image opens up to single 
contexts which have to be distinguished, in order to grasp the possibilities 
of common action and global change.51
The case of Russia represents the concrete collapse of logically different 
forms of historical development, whose progress cannot be predicted once 
and for all because it has to do with the role of the revolutionary forces as 
the collective subject of history. 
In other words, the Russian milieu is a tangible manifestation of 
historical dialectics, which can only be explained in terms of revolution. 
Conclusion
With increasing clarity, Marx’s theory of history takes the shape of 
an uneven and combined development, that grasps the accelerations, the 
interruptions and the breaks in the historical path. I dare say this is the 
main legacy of Hegel’s thought, who describes the progress of the spirit 
in world history not as a “peaceful growth”, but as a war of the spirit with 
itself. At the end of his life, Marx – after reading the results of the on‑site 
researches of contemporary anthropologists, and having become familiar 
with a variety of concrete cases of non‑Western societies – can no longer 
make Hegel one of the sources on which to build an image of the Orient 
as opposed to contemporary capitalist society. But Hegel’s dialectics, in a 
demystified form, remains a common thread in Marx’s thought. 
51  “This poses the question: can the Russian obshchina, a form, albeit heavily eroded, of 
the primitive common ownership of the land, pass directly into the higher, communist 
form of communal ownership? Or, must it first go through the same process of dissolution 
which marks the West’s historical development?
Today there is only one possible answer. If the Russian Revolution becomes the 
signal for proletarian revolution in the West, so that the two complement each other, then 
Russian peasant’s communal land‑ownership of land may serve as the point of departure 
for a communist development.” Marx – Engels, Vorrede zur zweiten russischen Ausgabe 
des “Manifestes der Kommunistischen Partei”, in MEGA I/25, p. 296 (trans. in Theodor 
Shanin (ed.), Late Marx and the Russian Road, p. 139).
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To conclude, we can turn to Lenin (who greatly admired Chernyshevsky,52 
by the way) and his conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic – “Leaps! 
Leaps! Leaps!” and “Breaks in gradualness!”53 – to sum up the core of 
Marx’s critical and revolutionary dialectics, as he himself defines it in the 
1873’s Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital.54 
ABSTRACT
My article does not aim at a comparison between Hegel’s and Marx’s 
points of view on Asia as such. The Hegelian motives are employed to understand 
the place and the significance of the Orient in Marx’s writings from the 1850s 
onwards. The more Marx learns from original and/or updated sources on the 
Oriental societies, the more Hegel’s authority seems inadequate to provide a 
reliable and comprehensive account of their history and social organization. Yet 
his “spirit” still holds together the different perspectives from which the subject 
is approached by Marx (economy, history and praxis, above all). In other words, 
Marx’s interest in Asia is here considered through the lens of Hegel’s legacy in 
order to reflect on the endless effort of the materialistic dialectic to encompass the 
complexity of reality and global history. 
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RIASSUNTO
Lo scopo del mio articolo non è un mero confronto tra i punti di vista 
di Marx e Hegel sull’Asia. I motivi hegeliani sono richiamati per comprendere 
il posto e il significato dell’Oriente nei testi marxiani dagli anni Cinquanta 
dell’Ottocento in poi. Quanto più Marx apprende da fonti originali e/o aggiornate 
sulle società orientali, tanto meno Hegel sembra mantenere il suo ruolo di autorità. 
52  See, for instance, Lars T. Lih, Lenin Rediscovered. What Is to Be Done? In Context, 
Leiden‑Boston: Brill, 2006, p. 564. 
53  See Lenin, Collected Works, Moscow, 1960, vol. 38, p. 123. 
54  See Karl Marx, Das Kapital, I, Nachwort [1873], in MEGA II/6, p. 709. 
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Tuttavia, il suo “spirito” tiene ancora insieme le diverse prospettive dalle quali 
Marx affronta la questione (economia, storia e prassi su tutte). In altri termini, 
l’interesse marxiano nei confronti dell’Asia viene qui valutato attraverso la lente 
dell’eredità hegeliana per riflettere sul continuo sforzo della dialettica materialistica 
di afferrare la complessità del reale e la storia globale. 
Parole chiave: Modo di Produzione Asiatico – Obščina Russa – Filosofia della 
Storia Hegeliana – Materialismo Storico Marxiano – Dialettica
